

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

HIGH DEGREE OF AUTONOMY: THE REVERSION OF HONG KONG TO CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY

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At midnight on June 30, 1997, the British colony of Hong Kong reverted to Chinese sovereignty and it became a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the People's Republic of China. The Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong calls for maintaining Hong Kong's lifestyle and "high degree of autonomy" for fifty years after its transition to the Hong Kong SAR. The primary research question that this thesis attempts to answer is: How has the concept of "high degree of autonomy" been operationalized since its inception in the "Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong"? This thesis argues that during the period of time from the signing of the Joint Declaration to the actual reversion to Chinese sovereignty the negotiations over the concept of Hong Kong's "high degree of autonomy" established the framework for the post-reversion way of life in Hong Kong. This thesis looks at this issue in three areas - the political arena, the security environment, and the economy. This thesis also examines the situation in Hong Kong one year after reversion and answers the question, "Has China lived up to its promises in these three realms of autonomy?"

This period marks the start of a new political and economic experiment for China. China is attempting to regain the sovereignty of Hong Kong peacefully without disrupting its economic, social, and political systems under the framework of the Joint Declaration. The reversion of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty will be a test of China's "one country, two systems" concept.

DoD KEY TECHNOLOGY AREA: Other (Foreign Relations)

KEYWORDS: Hong Kong, Reversion, Joint Declaration, Autonomy, China's One Country, Two Systems Concept, Special Administrative Region (SAR)

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THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION: LEVERAGING RUSSIAN SPACE STRENGTHS TO CONTROL ITS MISSILE TECHNOLOGY PROLIFERATION

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In an effort to stop the old Soviet space program from plunging into a cataclysmic spiral of illicit foreign sales of its ballistic missile technology, and also to prevent the Russian space infrastructure from imploding, the United States entered into a series of bilateral and multi-national agreements to work with, and to support the inheritor of the Soviet space legacy, the Russian Space Agency. This thesis discusses how a partnership with the Russian Federation and Russian Space Agency within the International Space Station can both act as an incentive for the Russians to prevent illicit proliferation of its space and ballistic missile technology and offer unique, viable operational, technical, and scientific advantages for the International Space Station and the United States. Alternative options to, and limits on, a partnership with Russia will also be presented and discussed.

DoD KEY TECHNOLOGY AREAS: Aerospace Propulsion and Power, Space Vehicles, Others (International Space Station, Ballistic Missile Technology Proliferation)

KEYWORDS: Ballistic Missile Technology Proliferation, Aerospace Propulsion and Power

INFORMAL NETWORKS AND SAUDI REGIME STABILITY

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The increasingly vocal Islamist opposition to the Saudi regime, which gathered strength following the Gulf War, lent new urgency to predictions of the regime's demise. The fact that the Saud family has retained control of the government throughout this period of gloomy forecasting prompts the question - how has the Saudi regime managed to confound popular expectations and maintain power in the face of increasing Islamist opposition?

The central thesis of this study is that the Saudi government has prevented opposition groups from gaining significant popular following or developing power bases by eliminating or controlling informal networks within Saudi Arabia. This position differs from the most widely accepted explanations, which center around oil revenues resulting from the 1970's oil boom as the key factor in the longevity of the royal family. While undoubtedly an important tool used liberally by the Al Saud, this thesis argues oil revenues are secondary in importance and only part of a much larger and more significant effort in the regime's struggle against its opposition.

This study assesses whether Islamist opposition can seriously challenge the Saudi government by analyzing three case studies (concerning Pakistan and Egypt as well as Saudi Arabia) which consider how Islamist groups organize, what types of organizations are successful in challenging central authority, and how regimes respond to such challenges. Placing this information in context with the dominant roles tribe, class, and religion play in Saudi society provides a better foundation for assessing the future stability of the Saudi regime than traditional rentier theory.

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DoD KEY TECHNOLOGY AREA: Other (Foreign Relations)

KEYWORDS: Saudi Regime, Informal Networks, Islamist Opposition

MORNING CALM, NUCLEAR SUNSET: SOUTH KOREA'S ATOMIC OPTION

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U.S. national security strategy sets nuclear nonproliferation as a high priority. However, pursuing nonproliferation without regard for important traditional security relationships might yield undesired results. The Republic of Korea (ROK) requires a high degree of confidence in the U.S. security guarantee, one that includes an extended nuclear deterrent. The nuclear weapons program that South Korea began and abandoned in the 1970s was prompted by a decrease in confidence in U.S. security commitments. Conciliatory actions taken recently by the United States toward the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (DPRK) to prevent a possible nuclear weapons program may undermine the U.S.-ROK security arrangement that has been in place for decades. This work examines perceived threats to South Korea and the U.S. security commitment to Korea since 1945 to reveal how current U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy affects Seoul's propensity to develop nuclear weapons. Recommendations are provided for policy makers regarding strengthening of ROK confidence in the U.S. commitment on the peninsula with particular emphasis on preventing South Korea from pursuing a nuclear arsenal.

DoD KEY TECHNOLOGY AREA: Other (Nuclear)

KEYWORDS: Korea, Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation

JERUSALEM AND THE ARAB ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS

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The disposition of Jerusalem is among the handful of "final status" issues to be negotiated between Israel and the PLO according to the 1993 Declaration of Principles (the Oslo Accord). This thesis argues that, unlike other final status issues that are more technical and bilateral in nature, the issue and symbolism of Jerusalem are so entangled in *domestic* political processes that negotiated, bilateral resolution has become virtually impossible. That is, Jerusalem has become a defining issue within both domestic Israeli and domestic Palestinian political discourse and processes that resolving it equitably has become problematic even in the best of circumstances. While there is no shortage of creative, viable plans to share Jerusalem, there is a shortage of the domestic political space necessary to negotiate its resolution. As a general rule, the more a disputed issue *between* polities becomes a domestic political issue *within* the polities, the less likely it becomes to resolve it through bilateral negotiations.

DoD KEY TECHNOLOGY AREA: Other (National Security Affairs)

KEYWORDS: Jerusalem, Israeli Peace Process, Palestine, Israel, Islamic Jihad, Hamas

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

IRANIAN FOREIGN POLICY MAKING: DOMESTIC FACTIONALISM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

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While Iranian foreign policy making since the 1979 revolution has been erratic and even hostile to the interests of the United States, it has been anything but irrational and unintelligible. This thesis argues that Iranian foreign policy making is not enigmatic but rather can be understood in a systematic and rational manner. The key to understanding Iranian foreign policy making is the notion of factional politics in an unconsolidated polity. Put briefly, Iran has lacked a consistent and decisive center of power, leaving foreign policy-making in the hands of various elite factions. The seemingly erratic nature of Iran's actions is explained by noting which faction is behind various policies. Seemingly self-defeating foreign policies have often been designed for *domestic* political advantage. Foreign policy, like domestic policy, is a tool for advantage in Iran's factional power struggle—conclusions directly at odds with Neo-Realist theory.

President Khatami's pursuit of liberalization and rapprochement with the U.S. has highlighted the factional component of Iranian policy making. Understanding Iranian policy in this manner leads to a logical conclusion for U.S. policy makers: Khatami's overtures are genuine and strategic, not only because they will help Iran forward but also because they will help Khatami remain in power.

DoD KEY TECHNOLOGY AREA: Other (U.S.-Iranian Relations)

KEYWORDS: Iran, Foreign Policy, Domestic Political Factionalism, Comparative Politics Theory, Economic Liberalization Theory